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“THINGS CANNOT GO ON AS THEY ARE”:1 CONTEXTUALIZING 
HERBERT WECHSLER’S CRITIQUE OF THE SCHOOL 
SEGREGATION CASES 
ANDERS WALKER* 
This morning, constitutional scholar David Strauss asked us to reconsider 
Herbert Wechsler’s 1959 critique of Brown v. Board of Education in Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law.2  Read outside its historical context, 
Wechsler’s charge that Brown failed to establish a neutral legal principle for 
invalidating segregation, and that segregation might even have been 
constitutional, sounds obtuse.  Yet, a closer look at the historical record 
suggests that Wechsler may have had good reason for criticizing Brown when 
he did, and may actually have thought that by doing so he was helping, rather 
than hurting, the cause of civil rights.  This response, though brief, outlines 
how this might be so. 
When Herbert Wechsler stood up to deliver the Oliver Wendell Holmes 
lecture at Harvard Law School in April 1959,3 the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional basis for invalidating racial segregation in the American South 
was adrift.  Five years earlier, the Court had made headlines by ruling that 
segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because racial separation had “a detrimental effect 
upon [African American] children.”4  To prove this, the Court had cited social 
science data assembled by sociologists like Kenneth B. Clark, who used a 
variety of innovative techniques, including the presentation of colored dolls to 
children, to prove that segregation “has a tendency to retard the educational 
 
 1. These were the words of Minnie Jean Brown, one of the nine African American students 
who first integrated Little Rock, after her second expulsion from Central High School.  Little 
Rock Girl Sees More Strife: Expelled Pupil Doubts That 8 Remaining Negroes Can Stand 
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1958, at 59 [hereinafter Little Rock Girl Sees More Strife]. 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law; B.A. 1994 Wesleyan 
University; J.D./M.A. 1998 Duke University; Ph.D. 2003 Yale University.  I would like to thank 
Fred Bloom for his comments on an earlier draft and Mark W. Guest for his insights into 
connections between New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and civil rights. 
 2. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 33 (1959). 
 3. See id. at 1, n.†. 
 4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
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and mental development of [African American youth].”5  Despite early 
problems with this evidence, including its failure to engage the dominant 
thinking of sociologists at the time, scholars like Allison Davis, Kurt Lewin, 
and the Chicago School of Sociology, all of whom held that “proximity to the 
dominant group—not segregation—caused psychological conflict and 
personality damage,”6 the Court used Clark’s studies to justify invalidating 
racial segregation not just in public schools, but in other contexts as well.  In 
1955, the Court used Brown to invalidate segregation in public golf courses in 
Holmes v. City of Atlanta.7  In 1956, the Court used Brown to invalidate 
segregation on public buses in Gayle v. Browder.8  In 1958, the Court used 
Brown to invalidate segregation in public parks in New Orleans City Park 
Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege.9  Wechsler questioned the logic behind such 
opinions, particularly the Court’s tendency to simply invalidate segregation 
without going into any legal analysis.10  Assuming that “modern authority” 
 
 5. Id. (internal alteration omitted). 
 6. DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT & PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE IMAGE OF THE 
DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880–1996 124 (1997).  Scott makes the point that not only did the 
social science evidence in Brown contradict the segregationist position advanced by Southern 
states, but it contradicted the prevailing wisdom of social science generally at the time.  Id.  That 
wisdom held that psychological damage is more acute when members of subordinate groups 
come into close proximity with members of dominant groups.  Id.  If members of subordinate 
groups are successfully segregated from dominant groups, scholars at the time believed, they tend 
to suffer less psychological harm.  Id. 
 7. 350 U.S. 879, 879 (vacating Fifth Circuit decree holding that Brown v. Board of 
Education does not apply to public golf courses, and remanding case to be decided in conformity 
with Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), which affirmed the 
Fourth Circuit holding that segregated beaches and bath houses are unconstitutional pursuant to 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 
U.S. 637 (1950), Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954)).  The precise manner in which these four opinions applied to segregated beaches 
did not enter into the Fourth Circuit’s ruling or into the Supreme Court’s opinions in either 
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), or Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 141 (1955). 
 8. 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (affirming district court ruling in Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. 
Supp. 707, 716–17 (M.D. Ala. 1956), that segregated buses violated the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Brown v. Board of Education, Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, and Holmes v. 
Atlanta). 
 9. 358 U.S. 54, 54 (1958) (affirming Fifth Circuit ruling that segregated public parks 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whether there is psychological 
damage to African Americans or not, based on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Holmes v. City of 
Atlanta and Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson).  While the argument might be made 
that New Orleans v. Detiege did not rely on Brown because it cited instead to Holmes and Mayor, 
neither Holmes nor Mayor had any clear constitutional basis independent of Brown.  Indeed, the 
Court’s legal reasoning had, by 1958, become almost completely circular, citing opinions that 
cited other opinions that lacked any sustained constitutional analysis. 
 10. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 33. 
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supported the idea that segregated schools damaged African American 
children, which it arguably did not, how did Clark’s studies apply to buses?11  
Or golf courses? 
Long a supporter of merging social science and law, something that he 
himself had done in his criminal law casebook and later as reporter for the 
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, Wechsler began to suspect that 
the Supreme Court was playing fast and loose with sociological data, a fear 
that led him to further criticize the Court’s social science evidence as it applied 
in the school context.12  “Was [the Court] comparing the position of the 
[African American] child in a segregated school with his position in an 
integrated school where he was happily accepted and regarded by the whites,” 
wondered Wechsler, “or was [the Court] comparing his position under 
separation with that under integration where the whites were hostile to his 
presence and found ways to make their feelings known?”13  Wechsler’s interest 
in the possibility that white students might be hostile to black students, not 
something that the Supreme Court had considered in 1954, coincided closely 
with the experience of the nine African American students who finally gained 
access to Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957.14  Their first 
year of integration had been so bad, and their bad experiences so widely 
publicized, that it seemed difficult to conclude that desegregation had 
psychologically helped them.  For Melba Pattillo, one of the nine black 
students who enrolled in Central High in September 1957, her first year of 
integrated education at Little Rock amounted not to psychological uplift but 
nine months of racial “torture.”15  The white students “physically and mentally 
tortured us,” remembered Pattillo,16 “no one talked to me, no one 
acknowledged my presence.”17  The only white students who did acknowledge 
 
 11. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 12. Wechsler discussed his early interest in social science as a guide for law during an 
interview conducted by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller in August 1978.  See Columbia Oral 
History Project, Life of Herbert Wechsler  (Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller interviewers, 1978–
1982).  Early examples of Wechsler’s interest in social science emerged in his criminal law 
casebook, JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW & ITS ADMINISTRATION: 
CASES, STATUTES, & COMMENTARIES (1940), and his work on the American Law Institute’s 
Model Penal Code.  See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 
HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1102–04 (1952). 
 13. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 33. 
 14. See, e.g., Little Rock Girl Sees More Strife, supra note 1. 
 15. Interview by Scholastic, with Melba Pattillo Beals (Jan. 31, 1995) (on file with author), 
available at http://content.scholastic.com/browse/article.jsp?id=4799 [hereinafter Beals 
Interview]; see also MELBA PATTILLO BEALS, WARRIORS DON’T CRY: A SEARING MEMOIR OF 
THE BATTLE TO INTEGRATE LITTLE ROCK’S CENTRAL HIGH (1994). 
 16. Beals Interview, supra note 15. 
 17. Id. 
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Pattillo’s presence, she recalled, “called me names or spat on me.”18  Her 
fellow black students had similar experiences.  In December 1957, harassment 
from white students prompted Minnie Jean Brown, another one of the Little 
Rock Nine, to lose her temper and dump “food on [a] white boy,” conduct for 
which she was promptly suspended.19  One month later, Darlene Holloway, a 
white Central High student, assaulted another one of the African American 
girls at the school, prompting Holloway’s suspension.20  Over the course of the 
rest of the spring semester in 1958, white students continued to assault their 
black peers, striking them with purses, kicking them, showering them with 
food, intimidating them with signs encouraging them to leave, and in the case 
of a white student named Billy Ferguson, throwing an African American girl 
down a flight of stairs.21 
All of these conflicts made it into the New York Times and, presumably, 
onto Herbert Wechsler’s breakfast table.  Not only that, but as day-to-day 
conditions for the African American students in Central High School 
worsened, New York City reached out to the nine African American students 
at Little Rock, trying to save them from the horror of their newly integrated 
conditions.  Following her second suspension from Central High School in 
January 1958, for example, Minnie Jean Brown received a scholarship to 
attend the private New Lincoln School on West 110th Street in New York 
City.22  Convinced that white harassment would only continue in Little Rock, 
Brown left Arkansas mid-year, moving to New York in February.23  Once 
there, she stayed with Kenneth Clark, the same social scientist whose 
questionable evidence had been used to invalidate segregation,24 and was 
greeted by a representative of the Lincoln School and fifty delegates of city 
youth councils and high schools in New York.25  Not only did New York 
school officials become interested in the plight of the Little Rock Nine, but so 
did national intellectuals.  Hannah Arendt, then teaching at the University of 
California Berkeley, wrote an article in the fall of 1957 questioning the logic 
behind Brown, not because she sympathized with whites, but after viewing a 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Negro Suspended at Central High: Girl Dumps Food on White Boys in Little Rock—New 
Attack on N.A.A.C.P. Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1957, at 31. 
 20. White Girl Reports Little Rock Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1958, at 23. 
 21. BEALS, supra note 15, at 231–34; Little Rock Gets Guard at Night: Troops Posted at 
School as “Precautionary” Step After Clash of 2 Students, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1958, at 10. 
 22. Little Rock Girl Sees More Strife, supra note 1. 
 23. Mildred Murphy, School Welcomes Little Rock Girl: Director Greets Expelled Negro 
Pupil Here—She Hopes for Calm Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1958, at 29. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.; Little Rock Girl Sees More Strife, supra note 1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] “THINGS CANNOT GO ON AS THEY ARE” 1215 
picture of one of the Little Rock Nine surrounded by a mob of her white 
peers.26 
The alarming outbreak of white-on-black violence in Central High School 
over the course of the 1957–1958 school year did more than just bother 
intellectuals and school officials.  From a legal perspective, it undermined the 
Supreme Court’s argument in Brown that segregated public schools violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precisely because 
they had a “deleterious” effect on the “educational and mental development” of 
African American children.27  Ignorant of the extent to which white children 
would themselves exercise a deleterious effect on black students by terrorizing 
them, the Court found its constitutional position eroding as each integrated 
school day in Arkansas passed. 
By September 1958, one year after the Little Rock Nine entered Central 
High School, the question of white-on-black violence in Arkansas’s most 
infamous public school landed on the Supreme Court’s doorstep.  In response 
to a petition by the Little Rock School Board showing that the first year of 
integrated learning had been marked by “chaos, bedlam, and turmoil” in which 
there were “repeated incidents of more or less serious violence directed against 
the Negro students,” and that the “education of the students had suffered” to 
the point that a two year suspension of integration was in order, the Supreme 
Court wheeled out a new constitutional principle to bolster its holding in 
Brown.28  In Cooper v. Aaron, decided on September 29, 1958, the Court 
accepted the Little Rock School Board’s argument that “the educational 
progress of all the students, white and colored . . . [had] suffered” under 
integration.29  Yet, educational progress and psychological health were no 
longer pivotal to the question of segregation’s constitutionality.  After twelve 
months of hearing that desegregation in Little Rock had devolved into torture 
for black students, the Court did not just affirm Brown but revised it by 
suddenly invoking the concept of due process as a constitutional basis for 
invalidating Jim Crow schools: “The right of a student not to be segregated on 
racial grounds in schools,” announced the Court in Cooper, “is indeed so 
fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of 
law.”30 
The Court’s invocation of due process of law, particularly for 
constitutional scholars like Herbert Wechsler, was troubling.  Both the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which at that point in time applied only to the 
federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied to the 
 
 26. Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, 6 DISSENT 45, 50 (1959). 
 27. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 32. 
 28. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 13 (1958). 
 29. Id. at 15. 
 30. Id. at 19. 
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states, possessed due process clauses.  In fact, the Supreme Court had relied on 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to justify invalidating public 
school segregation in Washington D.C. in Bolling v. Sharpe, a companion case 
to Brown in 1954.31  Yet, the Court had made it clear in Bolling that proving a 
violation of due process was harder than proving a violation of equal 
protection; indeed the only reason the Court turned to due process in the D.C. 
context was because the capitol was not in fact a state.32  However, the Court 
made no effort to explain why, in Cooper v. Aaron, segregation violated the 
due process rights of African American students.  Instead, it simply cited to 
Bolling v. Sharpe.33 
What was going on?  Assuming that the Court remembered the Fifth 
Amendment did not apply to the states, was it trying to incorporate the Fifth 
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment, a move that the Warren 
Court would become adept at in the 1960s?  Or, was the Court trying to raise 
the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, along 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, also invalidated 
public school segregation?  If so, on what ground did it justify this move?  
How precisely did segregation deprive black students of their right to life, 
liberty, and property?  The Court provided no explanation, a silence that 
Herbert Wechsler found unsettling.  To him, the Court was not moving 
towards a neutral principle of constitutional law, but was instead drifting 
through the Constitution, cutting and pasting bits and pieces of language to 
justify normative results.  While Wechsler did not disagree with the results, a 
fact he made sure to state before his Harvard audience, he worried that the 
Court was not only muddling constitutional theory, but jeopardizing the fate of 
African Americans in the South.34 
Already, Little Rock had done much to disprove the Court’s argument that 
integration was psychologically beneficial to black students, a theory that the 
Court had used not only to justify Brown but to invalidate segregation in a 
variety of other contexts as well.  Further, the interracial violence that had 
emerged at Central High School was having mixed results on national 
attitudes.  While it is certainly true that Orval Faubus’s defiance of federal 
authority in September 1957 turned national opinion against massive resistance 
in the South, the day-to-day realities of integration for white and black students 
at Central High were not necessarily selling Northern audiences on the benefits 
 
 31. Bolling v. Sharpe, 847 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 32. Id. at 498–99.  As the Court explained in Bolling, the “‘equal protection of the laws’ is a 
more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of law.’”  Id. at 499. 
 33. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19. 
 34. See Wechsler, supra note 2, at 27–34. 
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of desegregation either.35  In fact, white parents in New York City showed 
increasing skepticism regarding the normative value of integrating public 
schools over the course of the 1957–1958 school year.  In October 1957, for 
example, white parents in Brooklyn resisted an attempt by the NAACP to have 
a school district in Bedford-Stuyvesant, a predominantly black neighborhood, 
rezoned to incorporate white students.36  Part of the hesitation resulted from 
increasing violence between rival teenage gangs, organized along racial lines, 
in the Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick neighborhoods.  In November 1957, 
a special grand jury called to investigate lawlessness in New York City’s 
integrated public schools called for the assignment of police officers to patrol 
hallways after reports of fights between gang-affiliated students during class 
time.37  In January 1958, the principal of John Marshall Junior High School, an 
integrated Brooklyn school that had become the site of increasing violence, 
including the rape of a female student in the school’s basement, committed 
suicide by jumping off the roof of his six-story apartment house before being 
scheduled to testify before a Kings County grand jury investigating school 
violence.38  In April 1958, five teenagers were stabbed and beaten during a 
gang battle in Brooklyn between two predominantly black gangs, the 
Chaplains and the Bishops.39 
Southern voices were quick to point to New York’s problems as evidence 
that integration simply would not work.  “[I] would ‘hate to think what the 
metropolitan press would have done to us’” exclaimed Arkansas Governor 
Orval Faubus, “if the Brooklyn school violence had happened in Little 
Rock, . . . ‘[P]eople are not being told one-tenth of the trouble about racial 
problems outside the South.’”40  On February 5, 1958, Georgia Governor 
Herman Talmadge announced that the citizens of Georgia were “deeply 
sympathetic with the citizens of Brooklyn in the difficulties they are 
experiencing in maintaining the integrity and independence of their public 
schools.”41  Talmadge even went so far as to suggest that “the President of the 
 
 35. NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE 
SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S 277 (1997).  Numan V. Bartley shows that national opinion turned 
against massive resistance in the aftermath of the Little Rock crisis but fails to explain the 
surprising lack of national interest in Little Rock’s schools after Orval Faubus closed them down 
completely during the 1958–1959 school year.  Id. 
 36. Benjamin Fine, City to Spur Integration by Building of 60 Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
1957, at 1, 34. 
 37. Lawrence Fellows, Policeman for Each City School Urged by Brooklyn Grand Jury, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1957, at 1. 
 38. Emanuel Perlmutter, Head of School Beset by Crime Leaps to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 1958, at 1. 
 39. 2 Judges “Spank” Parents of Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1958, at 35. 
 40. Faubus Scores School Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1958, at 10. 
 41. 2 Senators Clash on City’s Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1958, at 16. 
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United States send Federal troops to Brooklyn to preserve order in the public 
schools there in the same manner that he did to force a new social order upon 
the public schools of Little Rock, Arkansas.”42 
While Talmadge’s request was, of course, ignored, Northern interest in 
seeing public school integration enforced in the South lagged during the 1958–
1959 school year.  In fact, few protested when Governor Orval Faubus shut 
down Little Rock’s secondary schools for the year, including Central High, 
denying public school education to its students.43  Meanwhile, integration 
stalled in other Southern states as well, as school officials abandoned massive 
resistance in favor of more intricate legal schemes that assigned students to 
schools based not on their color but a variety of more subtle racially coded 
criteria that included notions of “psychological fitness” background and “moral 
standards.”44  Such schemes held little interest for Northern audiences or the 
press, particularly as the NAACP began to accuse Northern school boards and 
Northern parents of thwarting integration attempts, particularly redistricting 
initiatives, in major cities like New York.45 
For Herbert Wechsler, looking back on all this in the spring of 1959, 
neither Cooper v. Aaron nor Brown v. Board of Education had done much to 
advance the civil rights of African Americans or the integrity of constitutional 
law.  Disappointed with the “ad hoc” manner in which the Supreme Court had 
approached the question of dismantling segregation in the South, Wechsler 
recommended that the Court either put together a coherent constitutional 
theory, move “toward neutral principles” as the title of his talk suggested, or 
get out of the political thicket.46  “[W]here there is room for drawing [legal] 
lines that courts are not equipped to draw,” wrote Wechsler, “I prefer to see the 
issues faced through legislation.”47 
While it has become fashionable to discredit Wechsler’s attack on Brown 
as an “obtuse” attack on the twentieth century’s greatest Supreme Court 
opinion,48 this view fails to take into consideration the day-to-day history of 
the 1957–1958 school year, not to mention the drop in national concern over 
continued segregation in the South during the 1958–1959 school year.  A close 
survey of the events leading up to Wechsler’s April 1959 address suggest that, 
if anything, he wanted the Court to do its homework or to leave things up to 
the other political branches.  Professor Strauss’s resurrection of Wechsler’s 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. BARTLEY, supra note 35, at 275. 
 44. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 358 (2004). 
 45. Fine, supra note 36, at 1. 
 46. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 31. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. __ 
(2008). 
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critique, consequently, invites us to reevaluate both the constitutional and 
political motivations that animated his neutral principles argument.  However, 
Strauss’s claim that Little Rock and Cooper v. Aaron acted as catalysts for the 
civil rights movement deserves closer scrutiny. 
By April 1959, the Supreme Court had failed to either achieve integration 
or sustain national interest in the cause of civil rights.  In fact, the Court’s 
glaring failure to accomplish appreciable results in the South led African 
American college students Ezell Blair, Jr., David Richmond, Joseph McNeil, 
and Franklin McCain to shun the courts and turn to direct action protest in 
February 1960, purposely entering not public schools but white lunch counters 
in Greensboro, North Carolina, and sitting down.49  Within a matter of weeks, 
black college students around the South staged sit-ins in public restaurants and 
cafeterias, leading Ella Baker to form a new civil rights organization, separate 
from the NAACP, called the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, or 
SNCC in April 1960.50  SNCC, together and sometimes in competition with 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference, or SCLC, 
mounted a very different, non-litigation centered campaign to effect social 
change, a campaign that hinged for SNCC on voter registration and for the 
SCLC on using direct action protest as a means of attracting national attention, 
shaping national opinion, and achieving legislative victory in Congress.51  As if 
reading Herbert Wechsler’s mind, in other words, young black activists turned 
away from the judiciary and toward the legislative branches of American 
government to dismantle Jim Crow.  In fact, in 1963, Wechsler even 
intervened on behalf of the Civil Rights Movement, arguing that the New York 
Times should be allowed to publish arguably slanderous information on 
Southern segregationist officials, precisely to effect political change.52  It was 
in this position, as supporting cast to the civil rights movement and the 
legislative process, that the Supreme Court finally played a role in influencing 
national opinion by indemnifying Northern media in New York Times v. 
Sullivan, a move that, as Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff argue in their 2007 
Pulitzer Prize winning book The Race Beat: The Press, the Civil Rights 
Struggle and the Awakening of a Nation, led to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 
 
 49. WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA 
AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 71–86 (1981). 
 50. CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 
1960S 19–23 (1981). 
 51. For SNCC’s political program, see CARSON, supra note 50, at 56–132.  For the SCLC’s 
program, see DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA (1978) and DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING 
THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE (1986).  For tensions between the NAACP and the SCLC, see ALDON D. MORRIS, 
THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR 
CHANGE 123 (1984). 
 52. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 303–10 (2000). 
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and 1965, and finally, long after Brown v. Board of Education and Cooper v. 




 53. GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
STRUGGLE AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 358, 364 (2007).  The centrality of the Northern 
press to the Civil Rights movement is also highlighted by David J. Garrow in Bearing the Cross.  
GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 51, at 239, 408–09. 
